1.0       Link’s Economic Update (issued by Link on 3 October 2018)


1.1       UK: The first half of 2018-19 has seen UK economic growth post a modest performance, but sufficiently robust for the Monetary Policy Committee, (MPC), to unanimously (9-0) vote to increase Bank Rate on 2nd August from 0.5% to 0.75%.  Although growth looks as if it will only be modest at around 1.5% in 2018, the Bank of England’s August Quarterly Inflation Report forecast that growth will pick up to 1.8% in 2019, albeit there were several caveats – mainly related to whether or not the UK achieves an orderly withdrawal from the European Union in March 2019.

1.2       Some MPC members have expressed concerns about a build-up of inflationary pressures, particularly with the pound falling in value again against both the US dollar and the Euro.  The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measure of inflation rose unexpectedly from 2.4% in June to 2.7% in August due to increases in volatile components, but is expected to fall back to the 2% inflation target over the next two years given a scenario of minimal increases in Bank Rate.  The MPC has indicated Bank Rate would need to be in the region of 1.5% by March 2021 for inflation to stay on track.  Financial markets are currently pricing in the next increase in Bank Rate for the second half of 2019.


1.3       As for the labour market, unemployment has continued at a 43 year low of 4% on the Independent Labour Organisation measure.  A combination of job vacancies hitting an all-time high in July, together with negligible growth in total employment numbers, indicates that employers are now having major difficulties filling job vacancies with suitable staff.  It was therefore unsurprising that wage inflation picked up to 2.9%, (3 month average regular pay, excluding bonuses) and to a one month figure in July of 3.1%.  This meant that in real terms, (i.e. wage rates higher than CPI inflation), earnings grew by about 0.4%, near to the joint high of 0.5% since 2009.  (The previous high point was in July 2015.)  Given the UK economy is very much services sector driven, an increase in household spending power is likely to feed through into providing some support to the overall rate of economic growth in the coming months. This tends to confirm that the MPC were right to start on a cautious increase in Bank Rate in August as it views wage inflation in excess of 3% as increasing inflationary pressures within the UK economy.  However, the MPC will need to tread cautiously before increasing Bank Rate again, especially given all the uncertainties around Brexit. 


1.4       In the political arena, there is a risk that the current Conservative minority government may be unable to muster a majority in the Commons over Brexit.  However, Link’s central position is that Prime Minister May’s government will endure, despite various setbacks, along the route to Brexit in March 2019.  If, however, the UK faces a general election in the next 12 months, this could result in a potential loosening of monetary policy and therefore medium to longer dated gilt yields could rise on the expectation of a weak pound and concerns around inflation picking up.


1.5       USA:  President Trump’s massive easing of fiscal policy is fuelling a (temporary) boost in consumption which has generated an upturn in the rate of strong growth which rose from 2.2%, (annualised rate), in quarter 1 to 4.2% in quarter 2, but also an upturn in inflationary pressures.  With inflation moving towards 3%, the Federal Reserve (Fed) increased rates another 0.25% in September to between 2.00% and 2.25%, this being four increases in 2018, and indicated they expected to increase rates four more times by the end of 2019.   The dilemma, however, is what to do when the temporary boost to consumption wanes, particularly as the recent imposition of tariffs on a number of countries’ exports to the US, (China in particular), could see a switch to US production of some of those goods, but at higher prices.  Such a scenario would invariably make any easing of monetary policy harder for the Fed in the second half of 2019.


1.6       EUROZONE:  Growth was unchanged at 0.4% in quarter 2, but has undershot early forecasts for a stronger economic performance in 2018. In particular, data from Germany has been mixed and it could be negatively impacted by US tariffs on a significant part of manufacturing exports e.g. cars.   For that reason, although growth is still expected to be in the region of 2% for 2018, the horizon is less clear than it seemed just a short while ago.


1.7       CHINA: Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems.


1.8       JAPAN: Has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy.


2.0       Link’s Interest rate forecast (issued by Link on 3 October 2018)

2.1       The council’s treasury advisor, Link Asset Services, has provided the following forecast:



2.2       The flow of generally positive economic statistics after the end of the quarter ended 30 June meant that it came as no surprise that the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) came to a decision on 2 August to make the first increase in Bank Rate above 0.5% since the financial crash, to 0.75%.  However, the MPC emphasised again, that future Bank Rate increases would be gradual and would rise to a much lower equilibrium rate, (where monetary policy is neither expansionary of contractionary), than before the crash; indeed they gave a figure for this of around 2.5% in ten years’ time but they declined to give a medium term forecast.  Link does not think that the MPC will increase Bank Rate in February 2019, ahead of the deadline in March for Brexit.  Link also feels that the MPC is more likely to wait until August 2019, than May 2019, before the next increase, to be followed by further increases of 0.25% in May and November 2020 to reach 1.5%. However, the cautious pace of even these limited increases is dependent on a reasonably orderly Brexit.

2.3       The balance of risks to the UK


        The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably neutral.

        The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates, are probably also even and are broadly dependent on how strong Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth turns out, how slowly inflation pressures subside, and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.


2.4       Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:


        Bank of England monetary policy takes action too quickly over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than Link currently anticipates.

        A resurgence of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, possibly Italy, due to its high level of government debt, low rate of economic growth and vulnerable banking system, and due to the election in March of a government which has made a lot of anti-austerity noise.  This is likely to lead to friction with the European Union (EU) when setting the target for the fiscal deficit in the national budget. Unsurprisingly, investors have taken a dim view of this and so Italian bond yields have been rising.

        Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU while Italy, this year, has also elected a strongly anti-immigration government.  In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel’s CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position as a result of the rise of the anti-immigration AfD party.  To compound this, the result of the Swedish general election in September 2018 has left an anti-immigration party potentially holding the balance of power in forming a coalition government. The challenges from these political developments could put considerable pressure on the cohesion of the EU and could spill over into impacting the euro, EU financial policy and financial markets.

        The imposition of trade tariffs by President Trump could negatively impact world growth. President Trump’s specific actions against Turkey pose a particular risk to its economy which could, in turn, negatively impact Spanish and French banks which have significant exposures to loans to Turkey.

        Weak capitalisation of some European banks.

        Rising interest rates in the US could negatively impact emerging countries which have borrowed heavily in dollar denominated debt, so causing an investor flight to safe havens e.g. UK gilts.

         Geopolitical risks, especially North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.



2.5       Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates


        President Trump’s fiscal plans to stimulate economic expansion causing a significant increase in inflation in the US and causing further sell offs of government bonds in major western countries.

        The Federal Reserve (Fed) causing a sudden shock in financial markets through misjudging the pace and strength of increases in its Fed. Funds Rate and in the pace and strength of reversal of Quantitative Easing (QE), which then leads to a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds, as opposed to equities.  This could lead to a major flight from bonds to equities and a sharp increase in bond yields in the US, which could then spill over into impacting bond yields around the world.

        The Bank of England is too slow in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflation pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than Link currently expects.

        UK inflation, whether domestically generated or imported, returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.


3.0       Debt Maturity

3.1       The maturity structure of the Council’s borrowing as at 30 September 2018 (as per section 6 of the main report) is shown below in graph format.